The Random Antiterrorism Measure (RAM) program uses random, multiple security measure that change the look of an installation’s force protection program and introduce uncertainty to defeat surveillance attempts and make it difficult for a terrorist to accurately predict security actions.
“A unit could conduct random antiterrorism measures by checking parking lots, conducting bag checks and ID cards in locations where that is not the normal security posture,” said Ann Moree, security manager, DPTMS.
This is basically what’s going on. The theory is that by making changes to the process it will be more difficult for someone to plan a way to defeat it (not really true, as several TSA pentests have shown).
There’s also this classic quote attributed to a German general during WWII:
War is Chaos, and the reason why the American Army excels at War is because they practice Chaos on a daily basis.
It may look like the front-line guys have no idea what’s going on, and that might actually be true. If they have no idea what’s going on, neither will anybody observing their activities.
I had not considered that. It sounds like it’s actually a sound precaution, or would be if TSA weren’t so incredibly incompetent and the threat so exaggerated.
Yeah I’m not sure how useful it is in practice - possibly not at all - but at least some of it is intentional and not completely the result of poor management.
I also wouldn’t be surprised if some of the apparent incompetence was intentional… but that’s just speculation.
I think this kind of reasoning just desperately tries to find reason in insanity.
You’re basically implying that the coordinated uncertainty is so incredibly good at being covert, that it’s absolutely indistinguishable from underpaid incompetence and power tripping pettiness.
Maybe I’m not giving enough credit to government agencies, but actual incompetence and artisanal pettiness seem to be more likely to me than a planned behavior.
I’ve always thought this was a fundamental floor in their logic. Since they don’t have bomb detectors at the entrances to the building, it’s all a bit irrelevant anyway since if I’m trying to take down a plane full of people I can blow them up just as easily in the airport as I can in the air.
That would matter if ‘screwing up’ had any bearing on the outcome, which isn’t the case because the TSA is just security theater. If they mix up the order and the result is just making you do whatever the thing is, then it is just wasted time with the same end result and security is NOT improved.
In all seriousness though, I’m not saying that RAM is effective in any measurable way. I’m saying that it’s part of the SOP and helps explain some of what people experience as apparently inconsistent behavior from the TSA.
It makes sense in theory to deter someone planning something sketchy. But if that’s the purpose, they should try to make it known to everyone.
Basically, the agents should be telling everyone - “yes, the procedure can change every time”, so the potential villain scouting out the procedures would think “oh man, I thought I got it figured out, but what if tomorrow they change the rules?”
If they instead keep insisting “you should know this, it’s the same every time”, the potential villain is more likely to feel confident in their preparation and go ahead.
Random Antiterrorism Measures
This is basically what’s going on. The theory is that by making changes to the process it will be more difficult for someone to plan a way to defeat it (not really true, as several TSA pentests have shown).
There’s also this classic quote attributed to a German general during WWII:
It may look like the front-line guys have no idea what’s going on, and that might actually be true. If they have no idea what’s going on, neither will anybody observing their activities.
I had not considered that. It sounds like it’s actually a sound precaution, or would be if TSA weren’t so incredibly incompetent and the threat so exaggerated.
Yeah I’m not sure how useful it is in practice - possibly not at all - but at least some of it is intentional and not completely the result of poor management.
I also wouldn’t be surprised if some of the apparent incompetence was intentional… but that’s just speculation.
I think this kind of reasoning just desperately tries to find reason in insanity.
You’re basically implying that the coordinated uncertainty is so incredibly good at being covert, that it’s absolutely indistinguishable from underpaid incompetence and power tripping pettiness.
Maybe I’m not giving enough credit to government agencies, but actual incompetence and artisanal pettiness seem to be more likely to me than a planned behavior.
I’ve always thought this was a fundamental floor in their logic. Since they don’t have bomb detectors at the entrances to the building, it’s all a bit irrelevant anyway since if I’m trying to take down a plane full of people I can blow them up just as easily in the airport as I can in the air.
They all collect together at the TSA line anyway.
Maybe it is as you say the government incompetence and the artisanal pettiness that are the planned behavior, knowing it leads to this randomization.
That would matter if ‘screwing up’ had any bearing on the outcome, which isn’t the case because the TSA is just security theater. If they mix up the order and the result is just making you do whatever the thing is, then it is just wasted time with the same end result and security is NOT improved.
This is just incompetence and shitty training.
Yeah, well, that’s just like, your opinion man.
In all seriousness though, I’m not saying that RAM is effective in any measurable way. I’m saying that it’s part of the SOP and helps explain some of what people experience as apparently inconsistent behavior from the TSA.
It makes sense in theory to deter someone planning something sketchy. But if that’s the purpose, they should try to make it known to everyone.
Basically, the agents should be telling everyone - “yes, the procedure can change every time”, so the potential villain scouting out the procedures would think “oh man, I thought I got it figured out, but what if tomorrow they change the rules?”
If they instead keep insisting “you should know this, it’s the same every time”, the potential villain is more likely to feel confident in their preparation and go ahead.
The other problem is TSA agents seem to massively overestimate how often people use air travel and how uncommon it is for like 95% if the population.